United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

75-1338 B

Pls

To be argued by MICHAEL YOUNG

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

-against-

ALVIN BURGESS,

Appellant.

Docket No. 75-1338

APPENDIX TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

WILLIAM J. GALLAGHER, ESQ.,
THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY,
Attorney for Appellant
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MICHAEL YOUNG, Of Counsel.



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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TIME AM.....

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- against -

Cr. No. (T. 18, U.S.C., \$659)

ALVIN BURGESS,

Defendant.

75CR_388

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

On or about the 18th day of November 1974, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant ALVIN BURGESS, with intent to convert to his own use, did wilfully and knowingly embezzle, steal and unlawfully take from a motor truck oil burners and oil burner parts of a value in excess of One Hundred Dollars (\$100.00), which were moving as and constituted a part of an interstate shipment of freight from Elyria, Ohio to Patchogue, New York. (Title 18, United States Code, Section 659).

A TRUE BILL.

Principle Willis

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

I will describe first the general principles that apply in all criminal trials, then the nature of the charges in this case and the specific rules of law that apply to these charges; some ideas on how to evaluate evidence, and finally something about reaching a verdict.

It is your duty as jurors to follow the law
as I state it and apply those rules of law to the
facts as you find them from the evidence in the case.

You are the sole judges of the facts. What counsel has said in argument is not evidence, nor any facts which are set forth in the summations nor in my instructions; if they are different from your recollection, your recollection governs. If my statement of the law is different from what you think it ought to be, you still have to follow the law as I spell it out.

You are to perform your duties as jurors without bias or prejudice for or against any party.

The law does not permit jurors to be governed by
sympathy, or prejudice, or public opinion.

The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of crime, so the law permits nothing but legal evidence presented before a jury to be considered in

support of any charge.

The presumption of innocence which has been mentioned is enough to acquit a defendant unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt from all the evidence in the case. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense, arising from the state of the evidence or from the rabs ence of evidence. A reasonable doubt doesn't mean a doubt that a juror asserts arbitrarily in order to avoid performing an unpleasant task; it doesn't mean beyond a possible doubt. It is rarely possible to prove anything to an absolute certainty and the law doesn't require this.

A definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt which is frequently used is that it refers to such a doubt as would make you hesitate to act in your own important affairs -- this is an important affair for the defendant.

The rule of proof beyond a reasonable doubt operates on the whole case. It does not mean that each bit of evidence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It means that unless the sum total of the evidence satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of the crime charged, you must acquit,

but if you have no reasonable doubt, you must convict.

An indictment, as you have been told, is just a formal method of accusing somebody of a crime. It is not evidence of any kind against the accused, it doesn't create any inference of guilt of any sort.

The defendant has pleaded not guilty and the indictment and the not guilty plea create the issue that you are to decide.

The law never imposes a duty on a defendant in a criminal case to produce any evidence. He has no obligation to testify, but if he does testify his credibility is to be judged just like the credibility of other witnesses and you can consider the motive that he has and the incentive he may have to tell a story that isn't true to help his case.

When you analyze the evidence, you can draw reasonable inferences based on your own common sense and general experience from any facts that you find were proved, but you cannot guess and you cannot speculate.

Now for the charges in this case:

The indictment is a short one, it says:

The grand jury charges that on or about the 18th day of November, 1974, within the Eastern District of New York -- which is all of Brooklyn and Queens and

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Long Island and Staten Island -- the defendant, Alvin Burgess, with intent to convert to his own use did willfully and knowingly embezzle, steal and unlawfully take from a motor truck oil burners and oil burner parts of a value in excess of \$100 which were moving and constituting a part of an interstate shipment of freight from Elyria, Ohio, to Patchogue, New York.

The indictment is based on Section 659 of Title 18 of the United States Code, which says:

"Whoever embezzles, steals or unlawfully takes from any motor truck or other vehicle with intent to convert to his own use any goods or chattels moving as an interstate or foreign shipment shall be fined or imprisoned," and I won't go into the amount or the penalty of imprisonment because that is for the Court to determine on the basis of a further hearing, if there is a determination of guilt.

In orderto find the defendant guilty, there are three elements that the Government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt -- four elements really:

First, that the goods were in fact stolen.

The statute says, "Withintent to convert to his own use," and if he turned them over to

somebody else or had somebody else take them and to whom they did not belong, that would satisfy the definition of "stolen."

The second element, that the goods were at the time a part of an interstate shipment, which is I think what Mrs. Seybert said, is not disputed in this case.

The third is that they were taken from a motor truck or other vehicle, which is a fact if you believe the evidence here;

And the fourth, that they were worth more than \$100 because the taking of less than \$100 is a lesser offense, it would not be a felony.

All of these elements have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. You can't infer the existence of one element of the crime from the proof of another element. If all the elements of the indictment are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should convict the defendant.

In this case there is no direct evidence that Mr. Burgess stole the goods, but there is circumstantial evidence from which you can infer that fact, and it is for you to determine what the proper inference is.

Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of

facts and circumstances indicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Circumstantial evidence is enough to support a conviction if you find that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the whole case.

You should consider inferences that are consistent with innocence as well as inferences that point to guilt. You have to consider the whole case, including inferences consistent with your common sense and leave out anything that is just guess work and determine whether you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact take these goods or aided somebody else in taking them.

When you determine the credibility of witnesses, you can consider the bias of the witness, his interest in the outcome of the case; you consider his manner while testifying, his candor and his intelligence as you have observed it.

You don't have to believe everything that comes from the witness stand, you are to determine how much of it is true.

You can consider properly the extent to which any testimony has been corroborated or contradicted; whether there are inconsistencies within the statement

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or testimony of any witness, whether any witness has changed his testimony. If there are such inconsistencies or changes, you can decide whether you are going to disregard all the testimony of the witness as you may if you say, I can't believe it. You can determine what part is true or you can say that he may have been mistaken with respect to a part of his testimony and accurate with respect to other parts, and you may accept some and throw out others.

You consider how important the details are, what the circumstances were in which the original statement was made and whether the statement which is made on the witness stand is true, regardless of earlier statements. Whether you are going to believe it is within your power as judges of credibility.

In dealing with the defendant's testimony, you can consider his relatively poor education and his background and decide whether that persuades you that he was telling you the best he knew or that he was making up a story that is not consistent with the truth.

There are a few special rules that might be considered here:

The defendant was not where he was expected to be the next morning. Intentional flight or concealment

of a defendant immediately after the commission of a crime is not in itself sufficient to establish guilt, but it is a fact which if proved may be considered by the jury in the light of all of the other evidence in the case in determining guilt or innocence. Whether it shows consciousness of guilt or that there is a significance to be attached to it is the province of the jury. You should consider there may be reasons for running away which are fully consistent with innocence, these might include fear of being arrested, unwillingness to confront the police, reluctance to appear as a witness or fright. A feeling of guilt does not necessarily reflect actual guilt.

never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. It is also the law that anybody who knows of the actual commission of a felony that is punishable in the Courts of the United States and doesn't make the facts known as soon as possible to some judge or other person in authority within the United States is violating the law. Certainly Mr. Burgess is not on trial for such a violation, but you can consider whether his failure to report it was because of fear or ignorance

or whether it was because he would have been reporting something of which he was guilty or likely to be suspected of being guilty.

There was reference in Agent Garber's testimony as to two or three women who were described as girl friends or commonlaw wives of Mr. Burgess. There is no evidence that he had any commonlaw wives other than Miss Banks, whom he mentioned, and who was in the courtroom, and I have permitted that testimony to show the efforts that were made to find Mr. Burgess. But you should not consider that fact as affecting his character or creating any inference of guilt, nor should there be any prejudice against him because he is living with a woman to whom he is not legally married. A commonlaw wife is something that we hear quite frequently about in our courtroom.

The question for you is simply whether this defendant did or did not take the oil burner parts that he signed for in the morning and took out on a truck but which when he brought it in that afternoon were not on the truck.

There is another rule about false exculpatory statements that I might make mention of:

When a defendant voluntarily and intentionally

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offers an explanation or makes some statement tending to show his innocence, and this explanation or statement is later shown to be false, the jury may consider whether this circumstantial evidence points to consciousness of guilt. Ordinarily it is reasonable to infer that an innocent person does not usually find it necessary to invent an explanation or statement tending to establish his innocence. Inferencesas to a defendant's explanation pointing to consciousness of guilt and the significance to be attached to any such evidence arematters exclusively within the province of the jury.

You can consider in dealing with the testimony that Mr. Burgess at the end of the day said that the oil burners had never been loaded on his truck, which would be an explanatory statement, but it turned out to be not true, that is if you believe Mr. Martin or Mr. Jackson that he made that statement. I think he denied making the statement.

There has been reference to Mr. Burgess's prior conviction of possession of a stolen automobile:

Such evidence is admissible but not for purposes of showing bad character. It is admissible as bearing on the intent or motive or anything else but

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not bad character because he has already been sentenced and you cannot punish him for that. The question is whether he did in fact steal the goods that were given to him in the morning.

Now a few things about reaching a verdict: When you retire to the jury room, Mr. Chestang will act as your foreman and preside over your deliberations. He should try to see to it that everybody gets a chance to talk, that only one person talks at a time, and that you pick out a reasonable time at which to cast the ballot. Normally, you should not take any vote until you have had a chance to consider things thoroughly enough so that pe le are sure what they think, relatively sure. The purpose of deliberation is to let you hear what other people say and what other members of the jury may think. Nobody has to give up an opinion that he honestly believes in as to guilt or not guilty, but you should listen carefully to what other people say and see whether your original impression may yield to ideas or arguments of other members of thejury.

When you are considering guilt or innocence, don't give any consideration to the matter of punishment, that is a question that is exclusively within

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the province of the judge if the defendant is gound guilty.

If there is any question in your mind about some testimony, at least yesterday's testimony has been transcribed, we can read some of it to you; if need be we will get the reporter in who took the other testimony and have that read to you.

If you want to look at any of the exhibits, you can send in a note and they will be made available to you.

There will be a marshall outside the jury room door to take any notes that the foreman wants to send, and when you have reached a verdict you will just give him the note saying you have reached a verdict. You don't tell him what it is.

You will be called in and the foreman will be asked to announce it when you get in the courtroom and then the clerk will poll the jury and ask every member of the jury if that is in fact their verdict so that we know that it is a unanimous verdict.

This is not an early time to submit this to you, and it is a Friday aftern on. But it has been a fairly short case. I hope you will be able to decide it, if you can do so, by staying until 5 or 5:30,

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that is permissible. If you haven't reached a verdict and you want to adjourn over the weekend, you can request permission. In that event, I will excuse the two alternates and then I will have to count on all 12 being here on Monday. You have been faithful on the second day.

I will give counsel on both sides an opportunity to point out whether I have made any omissions or misstatements in my charge, and I may call you back again, but I am assuming that this is my final word to you until I hear something from Mrs. Seybert or Mr. Appleby.

Let me remind you that your oath sums up your duty, and that is without fear or favor to any man you will well and truly try the issues between these parties according to the evidence given to you in Court and the laws of these United States.

The next step is for the clerk to swear the marshals:

(At this point, the two marshales: were sworn.)

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Berkowitz and Mrs. Bennett, you can go in and get your belongings that you have in the jury room and then leave directly, but don't talk to the jurors at all.

The rest of the jurors can go into the jury room.

(At 3:35 p.m. the jury left the courtroom to begin its deliberations.)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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I certify that a copy of this brief and appendix has been mailed to the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York.

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